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Like any other body of historiographical work, the recent histori-
ography of Somalia has been shaped by the material realities that gov-
ern its production as well as the intellectual discourses from which it
emerged and against which it reacts. That this historiography has been
deeply influenced by the protracted civil war that has gnawed at the
country’s entrails since at least 1978 is obvious — more obvious, per-
haps, than the obverse, its influence upon the conflict. Be that as it
may, historians, social scientists, and other intellectuals — Somali and
non-Somali — have taken on the task of trying to explain what hap-
pened and why.
This essay will discuss a part of this intellectual production of the
last five to six years and analyze and evaluate some of its conclusions.
It does not claim to be exhaustive. To begin with, it excludes from its
scope a number of important and fully relevant subfields of Somali
Studies that must await the efforts of other scholars. Such fields
include the emerging studies of Somali refugees and the diaspora,
Somali literature and literary analysis, folklore and those anthropolog-
ical and historical studies that do not explicitly relate themselves to the
civil war, first-hand accounts of individuals who participated in and
were eyewitnesses to the war, pulp fiction that has adopted Somalia as
its evil backdrop, the very mixed bag of books on Somalia for adoles-
cents (middle and high school students), and those studies on the
UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia that focus primarily on the role of the
UN in post-Cold War peacekeeping. These separate and interrelated
new literatures deserve to be analyzed, as well. However, this essay
will be limited to those recent (mostly post-1994 and mostly book-
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length) studies of Somalia that examine and draw conclusions about
the civil war and state collapse.1
The studies selected in this, perforce imperfect, way will be dis-
cussed in three categories. The first category consists of general,
chronologically-organized historical syntheses that explain state col-
lapse in the light of a gradual undermining of the social and political
relations, economy, ecology, and cultural values of Somalia since the
inception of colonial rule. These syntheses are largely based on sec-
ondary sources, but they nevertheless make important contributions to
the field, either because they represent new ways of conceptualizing
the past or because they integrate themes and data that had not been
part of older syntheses. The second category consists of what can be
called a new school of history on southern Somalia, especially the
riverine and interriverine areas that have been at the heart of a brutal
struggle for resources between the state and local farmers since 1975.
This historiography presents new ways of conceptualizing Somali soci-
ety and unveils roots of conflict that had only been touched upon
before. The third category is less cohesive and deals with those studies
whose major focus is on state collapse itself. These, too, reflect on the
causes of the war but, in addition, almost unvaryingly, also recount the
processes that constituted and followed state collapse (including the
UN/U.S. intervention) and propose in more detail — implicitly or
explicitly—solutions.
II. Category One: The Historical Syntheses
One serious historical synthesis is Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe’s The Col-
lapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy, published in
1996.2 After a brief introduction about pre-colonial Somali society, the
author, in 148 pages, surveys Somali history from colonial occupation,
through the era of the nationalist struggle for independence and the
civilian and military governments, to the Somali-Ethiopian war, the
emergence of armed opposition movements, and state collapse. Mostly
based on secondary sources, the book uses Somali poetry as local com-
mentaries on the events and processes described.
The study distinguishes itself from older ones in three ways. First,
the author’s treatment of anti-colonial resistance does not limit itself to
an account of the Dervish movement of Sayyid Mohamed Abdille
Hasan but also includes the early, anti-Italian resistance of the Biya-
maal and Wa’daan of the south, and the later resistance of the two
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small sultanates of the northeast. Second, the author gives a particu-
larly nuanced and detailed analysis of the aftermath of the Somali-
Ethiopian war of 1977 – 78 and the emergence of the first armed
opposition movement against the Barre regime, that of the Somali Sal-
vation Democratic Front (SSDF). He presents the so-called “Majeer-
teen” coup of 1978 as a coup that was, in reality, prepared from within
the military by army officers of diverse clan backgrounds.3 It was
Barre, he argues, who, through the exemplary punishment of only
some leaders, created the myth of the “Majeerteen” coup in order to
isolate the group that was the first to taste the brutal collective punish-
ment of civilians that was to become Barre’s stock-in-trade. Whatever
the truth in this particular case may be, the process of demystifying the
Barre regime’s manipulations of history is still in its infancy.
Third, the author’s resistance against automatically reading clan
and clan-based motivations and behavior back into the past speaks to
his historical sensitivity. His awareness of how Barre created clan
hatred, for example, shows in his commentary on how the dictator sin-
gled out the so-called MOD (Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante) clans
for favorite clan treatment. The author reminds the reader that those
MOD intellectuals and others who resisted this favoritism toward their
groups were imprisoned. Those who did not step in line with Barre’s
clanist policies paid a high price.4
To what does Issa-Salwe, in the end, ascribe the disintegration of the
Somali state and society? First of all, he holds the colonial powers
responsible for the disintegration of Somali political institutions and
culture, through the appointment of paid chiefs, the institutionaliza-
tion of collective punishment, and the politicization of lineages in the
new context of the colonial state.5 Moreover, the imposition of nonvi-
able and unjust boundaries was a time bomb for future wars and vio-
lence. Second, the author holds the civilian governments responsible
for turning the clan into “a political instrument used by greedy and
ambitious leaders.”6 Third, he blames the Barre government for sow-
ing the clan hatred whose fruits are now being harvested by (1) sin-
gling out one group after another for near-genocidal destruction, and
(2) presenting brutal action by the state and servants of the state as the
work of particular clans against other clans.
The solution that Issa-Salwe proposes on the basis of this long-term
analysis is “clan-balancing:”
Lidwien Kapteijns
13
In the traditional Somali view, the overriding objection to the Barre
regime was that it was based on clan domination. And until state institu-
tions establish root in Somali society, it will be essential that clan equilib-
rium be maintained and political forces carefully balanced to share
power.7
How this is to be done in the absence of any dependable census ever,
and how such balancing will differ from the clan-balancing that has
been policy in the Somalilands since colonial times, the author does
not discuss.
While Issa-Salwe, with the exception of a casual reference to
Durkheim on anomy and Fromm on violence,8 does not bring major,
outside theoretical concepts to bear on the Somali situation, the second
historical synthesis to be discussed here, Alice Bettis Hashim’s The
Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia, does.9 Hashim
attempts to understand Somalia in terms of a number of theoretical
debates about the African state in general. On the question of whether
the African state is strong or weak, Hashim follows R. Fatton who
argues that an African state like that of Barre was strong because it was
predatory. The “strength” of Barre’s state lay first, she posits, in its
control of the formation of the state elite; second, it lay in the success
with which it defeated the unity of the subordinate class through “dis-
articulating” it, i.e., through dividing it so thoroughly by clan that a
focus on a common class project would be impossible.10 Instead of
forming a new state bureaucracy, Barre turned to a consolidation of his
own, personal, absolute rule, causing a double failure of the Somali
state.
First, she argues, “the absence of a hegemonic bourgeoisie, capable
of addressing issues on a national level and of cutting across clan lines,
created a vacuum into which an authoritarian ruler stepped.”11
According to Hashim, such bourgeois class formation, which included
both the state elite and the leadership of the opposition parties and
fronts, was preempted twice in Somalia’s recent history: once in 1960–
1969 and once in 1969 – 1978. The failure of this class therefore pre-
ceded the failure of the state. The second failure, Hashim contends,
was the failure of the common people to defend their common interest.
The common people have been unaware that clanism has been an
instrument preventing them from articulating a common class project.
As a result, they “still view their condition as they have always viewed
Bildhaan Vol. 1
14
it — the result of scarcity which must be overcome at the expense of
competing clans.”12
Hashim also brings the wider scholarly debate about ethnicity to
bear on the Somali case. In contrast to Joel Migdal, who believes that
remnants of traditional leadership undermined the state, she follows
Jean-François Bayart, who sees ethnicity as a tool and channel for com-
petition over wealth, power, and status. In the Somali case, Hashim
contends, such ethnic mobilization was first practiced by the post-
independence political elite and then brutally refined by the Barre
regime.13 Hashim agrees with Bayart that, in spite of the fact that local,
factional, and ethnic struggles have dominated the post-independence
era, “class formation is the key to the brutality of post-colonial military
dictatorships.”14
These are bold ways of attempting to conceptualize state collapse in
Somalia in a wider African context. They hold the promise, not quite
delivered in this book, of constituting a much-needed antidote against
old school and colonial insistence that Somalis are so unique that sys-
tematic comparison can be of no benefit. The rest of Hashim’s book,
however, does not quite live up to its beginnings, and the concepts
articulated in the introduction are not further developed and are, at
times, even undermined by specific interpretations.15
To what does Hashim attribute the disintegration of the Somali
state? Like other authors in this category, Hashim takes the long view
and lists as causes the legacy of colonial rule; the inability to constitute
a strong middle class to carry the state; group particularism and
clanism; war; natural disaster; the transformation of the pastoral econ-
omy; Somalia’s peripheralization in the world economy; dependence
on foreign aid; and dictatorship.16 Given her conclusion that collapse
resulted from this long “cumulative shattering process,”17 what solu-
tion does she propose? Her conclusion is comparable to that of Issa-
Salwe. Although she views clanism as, at least in part, caused by the
clan-balancing strategies of the first civilian regimes and Barre’s clanist
divide-and-rule,18 and although she regrets Somalis’ lack of awareness
of “the process of class disarticulation to which they have been sub-
jected,”19 she sees no remedy except in the separation of the clans.
Her vision for the future is “a new formula of government which
allows major clan families self-rule.” She feels that “[a] federal system
which allows Somali clan families a great measure of local self-govern-
ment and enables them to present a united front to the world is com-
mensurate with Somalia’s societal base.”20 This is problematic. Not
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only does it raise the question of the economic viability of such clan-
family homelands, but, even on the political level, three problems pre-
sent themselves. First, to the extent that the fighting of the most recent
stage of the civil war had as its goal and accomplished the “cleansing”
of members of the “wrong” clans from areas to be controlled by other,
currently dominant clans, does such a proposal not just mean reward-
ing the warlords and giving up on those who lost out? Second, the
political cohesiveness of clan-families or clans cannot be taken for
granted and is, in reality, just as problematic as the category of “Soma-
lis” as a whole. The brutal infighting of the sub-clan-based factions of
Aideed and Mahdi that followed the expulsion of Barre from
Mogadishu is just one compelling illustration. Third, if it would be
important that such clan-family states as Hashim and others propose
would protect the group (and individual) rights of sub-clans, minority
clans, and those groups (such as the so-called lower castes) who do
NOT fit into any clan family’s genealogy, then would such protective
arrangements in each homeland not also be appropriate for the sum of
all homelands, i.e., Somalia?
Equally ambitious in scope and objectives is Jasmin Touati’s Politik
und Gesellschaft in Somalia (1890 – 1991).21 If Hashim brought to her
analysis a background in political science, Touati comes to her topic
from sociology with previous research on the settlement of Somali
nomads. Touati’s historical survey, also largely based on secondary
sources, begins with two chapters on pre-colonial Somalia: the first, a
strangely old-fashioned and uncritical restatement of the classical
model of segmentary lineage politics; and the second, a dynamic
analysis of the pastoral economy. Of the remaining three chapters
(colonialism and resistance, nationalism and socialism, and the disinte-
gration of the sociopolitical system), the latter is most innovative, as it
includes an excellent analysis of how the Barre government underde-
veloped the pastoral economy.
Touati takes the Barre regime to task for its disdain for what it saw
as backward pastoral producers, its obsession with settling them, its
neglect of the range, and its failure to regulate the increasing monopo-
lization of grazing, water, and transport by a class of new rich. The
parallel processes of elite enrichment and land grabbing in the riverine
areas of the south escape Touati’s northern focus.22 Touati presents as a
major cause of state collapse the emergence of a “political aristocracy,”
which enriched itself at the expense of rural producers and used ethnic
clientism (clanism) to reach its particularistic goals. But mostly she
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holds the Barre regime’s increasingly corrupt and brutal policies
responsible. After it lost the Somali-Ethiopian war, she argues, the
regime turned against those who had led the war, meted out brutal
collective punishment against the civilians of some of those leaders’
clans, and thus caused the first armed opposition movement to
emerge. The Barre regime fattened itself on fraudulently acquired
refugee aid, armed itself to the teeth with the help of Western military
aid, and deepened its oppression.
The author contends that “politicized ethnicity such as clanism and
patrimonialism are not reinvigorated relics of a distant past but are
causally related to the socioeconomic modernization processes in
Somalia.”23 However, while she insists that the processes she analyzes
changed the ways in which clans work and function, clan belonging,
she argues, did not become less significant. On the contrary, “[t]he col-
lapse of law and order, the regime’s and militias’ terror as well as the
fragmentation of the political opposition strengthened people’s [ten-
dency to] search for shelter with their own clans.”24 Therefore, there
can be no political solution that fails to take into account “the political
importance of clans and their subgroups.” Consequently, “[t]he new
state which is to be created must orient itself on the social realities of
the country, i.e., both the segmentary structure and individual clan
interests must be taken into account. It will be of special importance . . .
to grant protection to smaller clans. . . . ”25 One must conclude, there-
fore, that even a scholar whose analysis of the causes of the civil war
includes increasing class inequalities, state-imposed modernization
schemes, and changes in the gender regime, looks for a solution to the
Somali conundrum primarily in accommodating Somalia’s warring
clans.
III. The New School of Southern History
The second category of books consists of studies that focus on southern
Somalia and that locate some of the major causes of social disintegra-
tion and state collapse in the historical, especially economic, processes
that have affected the south. One such study is Paolo Tripodi’s The
Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Adminis-
tration to Operation Restore Hope.26 Tripodi’s study focuses on Italy’s
relationship with, and impact upon, Somalia from the beginning of the
Trusteeship Administration (1950 – 1960), through the Barre period
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(1969 – 1991), up to the era of state collapse and the U.S./UN interven-
tion.
Tripodi’s first subject area is Italy’s performance during its trustee-
ship over Somalia. Throughout this part of the book, Tripodi repeat-
edly takes Italy to task for looking down upon, and failing to
accommodate, Somali clan allegiances and competition.27 This failure
had serious consequences. Tripodi argues:
In these first steps of Somali political life, while Italian influence
remained strong, the roots of the collapse of the democratic state can be
identified. . . . Instead of establishing a political system that could allow
the coexistence of clans, even the government was committed to eradi-
cate it.28
Accusing the Italian colonial government, or any colonial govern-
ment, of not being clan-conscious enough is unexpected, to say the
least, and Tripodi more often reasserts his conviction than corroborates
it. On the contrary, Tripodi shows that Italy, for more than half a
decade, remained hostile to the Somali Youth League (SYL), which ran
on a nationalist, explicitly anti-clanist platform. Moreover, the electoral
law of 1955 organized elections in the rural areas not by individual
male suffrage as in the municipal areas (a small minority of voters),
but by clan acclamation, through clan gatherings.29 Rural Somalis were
to appoint a representative, who then pledged the votes of all his clans-
men to a specific party. Tripodi himself concludes that, “[a]s a conse-
quence of this decision, the clan system was reinforced. In fact, . . . the
clan’s male populations were forced to find a representative party of
[sic] the clan and the coincidence between clan and party became
intense.”30 The author even suggests that it was the Italian administra-
tion’s aim “to fragment the political scene, and to gain greater control
over members of clans and sub-clans that were close to the administra-
tion . . . [and] to halt the SYL’s successes in Somalia.”31 As it happened,
this scheme did not work and, even in these circumstances, the SYL
won a majority of seats. However, this kind of policy hardly consti-
tutes an Italian neglect of clan politics and allegiances.
So when did the Trusteeship Administration fail the traditional clan
structure of Somalia? Tripodi locates this failure in the administra-
tion’s gradual acceptance of the SYL as the governing party. He writes:
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The main aim of the Italian administration was to identify the strongest
political formation and establish with it links that would remain strong
even after the end of the mandate. As a result, the AFIS [Trusteeship
Administration] gave up supporting the southern regional political par-
ties in favour of a rapprochement with the SYL. With this attitude, which
failed to respect Somali traditional structure, Italy promoted the adop-
tion of a form of state inappropriate to the Somali people32. . . . Ten years,
or even a hundred years, are not enough to change the main features of a
population, especially in countries like Somalia where these institutions
are steeped in centuries of tradition.33
The author’s implicit prescription for a new Somalia, therefore, is to
build on these century-old traditions of clan-balancing.
More convincing to this reviewer’s mind is Tripodi’s analysis of his
second major theme, the economic policies of the Italian administra-
tion. The author takes Italy to task for having had neither the resources
nor the know-how or foresight to prepare Somalia economically for
independence. By the end of the decade, he argues, “the Italian com-
munity, now reduced to about 2,000 people, was in control of 70 per-
cent of Somalia’s economy.”34 This included three-fourths of Somalia’s
agricultural production, almost the entire industrial output, and 50
percent of trade. This Italian community was favored and protected by
the administration.
A third subject matter of Tripodi’s study is Italy’s role in supporting
the Barre government. Having been somewhat marginal to Somalia in
1961 – 1975, Italy opened the sluice gates of aid following its establish-
ment of, first, the Department of Cooperation and Development (1979),
and then the Fondo Aiuto Italiani (1985). The author’s description of
the Italian bid for Great Power status and the fantastic corruption
schemes that enriched Italian and Somali politicians alike are worth
reading. According to Tripodi, Italian foreign policy “did not have
long-term objectives” or “a detailed strategy;”35 it did not even use the
huge amounts of aid money to pressure Barre into reform. Until the
dictator’s last days, the Italian ambassador in Mogadishu continued to
try to save the regime and reconcile it with the opposition, and it was
not until January 12, 1990, fifteen days before Barre himself was driven
out, and in the middle of violent street fighting, that the ambassador
was airlifted out of the city. Although Tripodi does not go as far as
Pietro Ugolini, who holds Italian policies fully responsible for the
Somali civil war, his criticism is withering.36
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Much more positive is Tripodi about Italy’s performance in the
UN/U.S. intervention of 1992, this book’s fourth major theme.
Although Italy saw its role in peacekeeping as “a new tool of foreign
policy,” and “an instrument to strengthen its international position,”37
he commends the Italian troop commander for resisting the U.S. policy
shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcing. The latter, he argues,
involved “indiscriminate and disproportionate” use of force, including
shooting at unarmed civilians.”38
Written from a more explicitly and polemically southern point of
view is The Invention of Somalia,39 a collection of essays that takes issue
with how existing scholarship has conceptualized or “invented”
Somali history and society. The authors are particularly incensed
about earlier presentations of Somalia as homogeneous and about the
fact that northern, pastoralist images, metaphors, and other cultural
forms have for a long time dominated any representation of Somalia.
There is truth in these statements.40 A particularly powerful example of
the neglect of Somali diversity is the introduction of the official Somali
orthography of 1974 (and the literacy campaign that followed), which
failed to accommodate the sounds of the southern Maay dialect. This
historiographical initiative, moreover—all the more powerful because
the power relations on the ground are still being worked out—clamors
for new attention and equitable treatment of the farmers and agro-pas-
toralists of the riverine areas. That this population includes groups that
have borne the burden and stigma of past enslavement makes this
appeal even more compelling.
Given the gravity of the subject matter, one may fairly ask how well
the authors of the collection acquit themselves of the task they set. In
this context, one must note that many essays of this collection betray
their origins as conference papers. They are bold in tone and strong in
spirit, but they are often more successful in articulating their discon-
tent with the status quo than in supplying new scholarly data and inter-
pretations to the newly proposed paradigm. Among the best chapters
in the book, then, are small but significant contributions to a new
scholarship on the south: Catherine Besteman on the Gosha,41
Francesca Declich on dance societies in the Jubba Valley,42 and
Mohamed Kassim on the nineteenth-century Islamic scholars (male
and female!) of Brava.43 In the same vein, M.H. Mukhtar’s proposal to
rethink Somalia’s Islamic history from the vantage point of the south is
most valuable when he describes aspects of southern Islamic devotion
and history that have until now been largely unknown.44
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As part of a vindication of the south, Abdi Kusow surveys the sec-
ondary literature about the origins and history of the Somali language.
However, his core argument, that would move up the formation of the
Maay dialect one century in time (and thus make it ancestral to all
other forms of Somali spoken today), is not linguistically supported.45
It is, moreover, contradicted by Christopher Ehret’s chapter summariz-
ing historical linguistics’ most current conclusions, with no comment
from the collection’s editor.46
Christine Choi Ahmed takes on other misconceptualizations of
Somali society, i.e., the representation of women in scholarship on
Somalia.47 Unfortunately, rather than trying to assess the field as a
whole or developing the theoretical principles of which she disap-
proves systematically, she attacks certain scholars for representing
Somali women as weak, socially unequal, or victims of men. In this,
she does not distinguish between analyses of social institutions and
structure (which are still forcing women to navigate a different and in
some aspects unequal social terrain) and judgments of Somali women
as actors with powerful and purposeful agency. That Somali women
were and are powerful agents in their own lives and society Choi
Ahmed indeed shows, but she does so mostly through anecdotal evi-
dence and by quoting the very authors she dismissed before. Never-
theless, even if this chapter does not make a substantial contribution to
the agenda it proposes, this agenda, which calls for more and more
women-centered research, certainly stands.
Implicit in The Invention of Somalia is the diagnosis that faulty and
biased scholarship has contributed to the disintegration of Somalia. To
sum up the argument, this old scholarship insisted on Somali homo-
geneity at the expense of the interriverine south, glorified cultural rep-
resentations of the nomadic north,48 neglected or had disdain for the
history and culture of the south, accepted androcentric images of
women, and was “unrealistic” about clan.49 Ali Jimale Ahmed, the edi-
tor, does not elaborate on what a realistic approach to clan would be.
However, Abdalla Omar Mansur reminds us of how historically sus-
pect the genealogies that have played such a crucial role in Somali
political and social action really are.50 To illustrate this, he makes two
points. First, he points at the contradictions in the ways the genealo-
gies of the clan families attach themselves to the family of the Prophet.
Second, he argues that the similarity of these clan families’ founding
myths, both with each other and with indigenous religious counter-
parts (all pointing to trees as the site of God’s communication with
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humans), make them symbolical statements rather than assertions of a
literal historical truth.
The most substantial new body of work in this tradition of new
southern history is undoubtedly the excellent collection entitled The
Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War.51 The
essays gathered here (not all of which are discussed in this article) are
based on extensive fieldwork in the riverine areas of the south in the
middle and late 1980s. Much of this research was commissioned by
various international development agencies—thus forming part of the
foreign aid avalanche of which it is so critical — and therefore focuses
on resource use and control, and on socioeconomic relations among
farmers, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, traders, and the state.
The story of the Lower Jubba Valley, with its ethnically diverse and
distinct population, is best told by Kenneth Menkhaus, this genera-
tion’s pioneer of in-depth fieldwork in this region.52 Menkhaus first
outlines the history of the valley: how runaway and freed slaves first
settled along the river in 1830 – 1870; how they were politically
autonomous but in competition with surrounding nomads in 1870 –
1895; how Italian colonists alienated parts of their land and forced
whole villages into compulsory labor on banana plantations; and how
even the British military administration (of 1942) conscripted their
labor to grow food. During the Trusteeship Administration, Menkhaus
argues, close UN supervision made sure that the valley inhabitants
were left in peace and even received some agricultural extension ser-
vices. The years of civilian independent rule, 1960–1969, were years of
benign neglect, he posits, but this changed dramatically in the 1970s.
Then the Barre regime carved out large areas of land for state farms,53
slapped new land registration laws on the people,54 and let loose on the
valley hordes of land-grabbing and speculating civil servants and
other cronies of the Barre regime (who had gotten their hands on
refugee aid and other foreign economic development funds).
Menkhaus points out that development wisdom of the day
approved of these undertakings, referring to them positively as “mar-
ket response” rather than “rent-seeking” and non-productive land-
banking by speculators who hoped prices would rise when the
Baardheere dam was built.55 As a result, valley farmers were forced to
fight three simultaneous battles. As a minority group, they were
looked down upon and rendered powerless by “a ‘self-styled’ homo-
geneous society;” as smallholders, they were squeezed by “commercial
and parastatal agriculture,” and as peasants, they were obliterated by a
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“rent-seeking state.”56 Menkhaus concludes that it is therefore not acci-
dental that this vulnerable and marginalized farming population was
trampled underfoot by militias moving back and forth through their
lands during the civil war. This violence was an integral part, the
author argues, of the schemes by which warlords positioned them-
selves for control of the most valuable agricultural resources.
The implications of this and similar research for an understanding
of the civil war and a search for solutions are powerfully formulated in
Besteman and Cassanelli’s The Struggle for Land, especially in the
“Introduction” and in Cassanelli’s “Explaining the Somali Crisis.”57
The editors explicitly take issue with the bulk of explanations of the
civil war and criticize the ways in which existing scholarship “has
tended to focus on personalities and clan politics at the national level
and has given precedence to analyses of kin-based elite competition for
administrative, economic, and military resources that flowed to and
through the state.”58 Instead, the authors of this collection, they argue,
focus on:
how local struggles for resources became increasingly intertwined with
national and international ones. Moreover, since most of Somalia’s best
farm land has historically been held by ‘minority’ groups, these strug-
gles reveal elements of ethnic and class conflict that go well beyond the
standard of clan-based analyses.59
Cassanelli spells out what this means for clan analyses of the crisis.
Barre was able to stay in power, he argues, because he controlled all
resources, including those flowing in as economic development and
military aid, and used them to buy loyalty. Cassanelli asserts, “That he
did this along lines of kinship and clientism gave precedence to clan
analyses of Somalia’s plight, but in fact it was his control of resources
that underpinned the system.”60 Focusing on how power-hungry war-
lords mobilized support along kin lines is not unimportant, but it can
mean confusing “the form the conflict took with its substance and
objectives.”61
The victimization of the population of the Lower Jubba Valley and
their distinct “ethnic” or “racial” status are brought center stage in
Catherine Besteman’s Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy
of Slavery.62 This book is based on the author’s earlier Ph.D. disserta-
tion, entitled Land Tenure, Social Power and the Legacy of Slavery in South-
ern Somalia (1991), but differs significantly from it. In response to the
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brutalization of the villagers she studied during the civil war, Beste-
man has adjusted her focus and conclusions. Land tenure and registra-
tion, which contributed to the economic underdevelopment of local
agriculture by the Barre regime, are moved to the background, while
race-based violence unique to the area is foregrounded as critical to an
understanding of Somali society and the causes of the civil war. Racial
discrimination against these farmers, who speak Somali, are Muslim,
and are mostly affiliated with a particular Somali clan, has affected
their view of themselves, targeted them for abuse from surrounding
nomadic groups, and marginalized them from elite status and state
favoritism, the author argues.
This, she contends, proves two points. First, it proves that “Somali
society was stratified by constructions other than clan,” and second,
that race was a critical cause of the civil war.63 Although Besteman’s
careful articulation of her conclusions moderate the impact of the sen-
sationalist and somewhat misleading title, there is intellectual slippage
in this argument, in particular if it is seen in the long-term history of
the local population. This becomes visible when one raises two ques-
tions. First, according to the new scholarship on the south, who is and
has been responsible for the racial “othering” and additional forms of
violence against the Jubba Valley farmers? Second, how large is the
group that is racially othered and has been targeted for violence?
One of the enemies targeted by the new scholarship is the generic
nomad. Although the authors are mostly careful to single out for criti-
cism the nomads glorified in national cultural production and state-
sponsored cultural policies, attacks on real nomads — people who
suffered from the same processes of agricultural underdevelopment as
the farmers — slip into the narrative. Thus, the nomad is criticized for
racial and cultural arrogance, expansionist tendencies, the tendency to
use force, and the disdain for manual labor.64 Those who admire the
nomad’s poetry and his anti-colonial resistance are labeled as
“Dervish-obsessed” and their honoring of this legacy is an insult to
Hawiya and Rahanweyn (Reewin) memory.65 Although there is some
truth in these (as in all) stereotypes, blaming nomads for how cultural
and political authorities have presented them, for complex and univer-
sal patterns of competition for natural resources, or for rapacious state
policies, is a slippery slope. One reaches its bottom when the economic
underdevelopment of southern agriculture by the national state elite
and international development organizations, as well as the subse-
quent ravishing of land and people by warlords with clan-based mili-
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tias, is blamed on northern “nomad groups,” groups that are called by
name, are both sedentary and nomadic, and probably make up almost
half of the Somali population, north and south.66
This kind of reductive conclusion does not do justice to the other-
wise sophisticated and innovative scholarship on which it is based. On
the contrary, it alerts us to the fact that some of the polarizations pre-
sented in this body of work—between farmers and pastoralists, seden-
tary and nomadic people, north and south, racial supremacists and
former slaves — are simplistic and therefore misleading. First, not all
southern agriculturalists are “racially” distinct; in fact, the percentage
of them that actually is “racially” distinct is not even known. Second,
the distinction between so-called “noble” and “slave” (or “com-
moner”) groups does not coincide with the north-south divide. As
Helander reports in his “The Hubeer in the Land of Plenty,” this divi-
sion exists within southern groups as well!67 Third, although these
authors do not seem to be aware of this, during the Zanzibari slave
trade of the nineteenth and early twentieth century — an aspect of the
global capitalist plantation system that also produced the Atlantic
slave trade and certainly was not initiated by Somalis—“mainstream”
Somalis indeed were among the slave traders; however, occasionally
“mainstream” Somali individuals might also be enslaved.68
Fourth, the essays in The Struggle for Land show that in the Upper
Jubba Valley the commoditization of farm products strengthened
farmers over nomads at the same time that in the Lower Jubba Valley
the fortunes of farmers fell.69 In the Lower Shabeelle Valley, in the
1980s, moreover, farmers and pastoralists had complex, ingenious,
and, at that time, peaceful techniques for resource sharing.70 This sug-
gests that it is not the juxtaposition of farmers and pastoralists itself
that leads to violence but the context in which that interaction takes
place. Fifth, Besteman and Cassanelli report that, until the 1970s, the
farmers of the Jubba Valley maintained “a modestly satisfying if not
privileged standard of living” and were “remarkably self-sustaining
and resilient.”71 Moreover, from 1870 until the establishment of colo-
nial rule, these settlements of former slaves established political auton-
omy, developed rules for access to land, defined structures of
authority, produced an agricultural surplus for export, and obtained
arms to defend themselves72—all this on what constitutes the best agri-
cultural land of Somalia.
The conclusion that must be drawn is that, although racial discrimi-
nation is a grave form of violence, it was not “race,” not even primarily
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“race,” that destroyed the Jubba Valley farmers. The Jubba Valley
farmers failed to hold their own only when race intersected with a
number of other factors: class, the predatory intervention of the gov-
ernment and the government elite, the misguided policies and unlim-
ited cash flows of international development organizations, and the
particular configuration of resources in the Jubba Valley. Besteman, of
course, makes this clear in the course of her book, but holding “race,
violence and the legacy of slavery” responsible for the “unraveling [of]
Somalia,” as her title suggests, is sensationalist and misleading.
IV. Figuring the Future of the Collapsed State
The third and final category of studies to be analyzed is much less
cohesive, but it nevertheless has a more defined focus on the moment
of state collapse in January 1991, the processes that caused, accompa-
nied, and followed it, as well as potential solutions. The studies
included in this category differ greatly in approach, focus, range, and
length. Thus, The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?
approaches the collapse from the longue durée of ecology, economy,
politics, social relations, and cultural change.73 On the other hand,
Anna Simons’ deeply flawed Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone is
anecdotal and fragmentary, basing (mostly derogatory) psychological
and sociological generalizations on what are no more than casual con-
versations and uncontextualized snapshots of life in Mogadishu just
before the collapse.74 Different again is Mending Rips in the Sky: Options
for Somali Communities in the 21st Century, which focuses almost exclu-
sively on the future. With its forty-one contributions, it provides a plat-
form for many voices, most of them Somali, and ranging from past
(and still aspiring) Somali government officials to community organiz-
ers and social workers in the diaspora.75 The relatively small category
of Somalia-centered studies of state collapse and its aftermath merges
and overlaps with the much larger literature about what lessons Soma-
lia can teach with regard to UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement
in the new post-Cold War world order. The latter are not included in
this essay, which will instead touch on those studies that constitute a
bridge between the former and the latter.76
Three themes are important in the studies of this third category: the
causes of the civil war, the U.S./UN intervention, and the proposals
for how to reconstruct Somalia.
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A. The Causes of the Civil War
The causes analyzed here fall into three somewhat overlapping cate-
gories: cultural, political, and economic. Compared to the chronologi-
cally-organized syntheses of the first category, these studies mostly
treat causes in an abbreviated form. However, for all their brevity,
these causal analyses are very telling. Several studies hold ingrained
nomadic culture (clanism) primarily or partly responsible for the civil
war. For Lewis, pre-colonial Somalis “lived in a state of chronic politi-
cal schizophrenia, verging on anarchy,”77 with violence so woven into
the warp and woof of their societal fabric that “characteristically, they
have usually impinged on the world outside in context of confronta-
tion and conflict.”78 Simons attributes the desperate sponging on other
people, the dishonest pilfering, and the undignified scramble for sur-
vival amongst Mogadishu’s white-collar and other poor in the 1980s,
to the unprincipled opportunism she deems characteristic of tradi-
tional nomadic life.79 Adam and Ford support this line of reasoning
and blame state collapse, to a large extent, on “centuries old . . . pro-
foundly Somali individualism and resilience, rooted in a clan structure
that . . .makes it difficult to create and sustain a centralized state.”80
For these authors, the Somali plight does not invite comparison
with the other failing states or the desperately poor masses of other
parts of the peripheralized Fourth World. The collapse occurred
partly, such reasoning suggests, because “the Somalis have for cen-
turies lived outside, or on the margin of world history,”81 for “the
Somalis . . .are not like other men.”82
Political causes also figure in the studies of this category. Among
them, colonialism takes an important place because of its undermining
traditional social relations and morality,83 the nonviable boundaries it
bequeathed to the Somalis, the irredentism it caused (which in itself
led to conflict and war),84 and the north/south differences that plagued
the Somali Republic after independence.85 Finally, the shortsightedness
and dishonesty of post-independence politicians, who manipulated (or
allowed themselves to be manipulated by) clanism at the expense of
the common good, and the clanist divide-and-rule policies of the Barre
regime constitute a third set of political causes.
It is the analysis of this last set of political causes that is problematic,
even more for what it fails to address than for what it does present.
Detailed and well-documented analyses of either the greedy civilian
governments or Barre’s violent campaigns to set clans up against each
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other are absent from the historiography. As for the crimes of the Barre
regime, almost ten years after Said S. Samatar wrote Somalia: A Nation
in Turmoil, which provides a good outline of Barre’s collective clan
punishments of civilians, hardly anything has been written to further
document the years of incitement to clan hatred.86 Nevertheless, that
Barre made his security forces commit acts of violence against mem-
bers of a certain clan (or clan family) falsely using the name of another
clan (or clan family) is a topic of many conversations. However, writ-
ten analyses of Barre’s tactics are still schematic, perhaps because no
clan group dares to denounce the perpetrators among its own ranks.
Barre’s instigation of what may be called “Somali-on-Somali” violence
— note the parallel with the so-called “black-on-black” violence
actively caused by the security forces of the now-defunct apartheid
government of South Africa — must be documented across or, better,
irrespective of clan lines.
A similar problem affects analyses of the moment of state collapse
itself. Even the studies of this category, with their more distinct focus
on the civil war itself, do not problematize or carefully locate in time
the transition from general opposition against a tyrannical ruler to
multiple campaigns of clan genocide, first against the clan family of
that tyrant and then between, within, and across clan lines. Instead, the
authors read clan hatred and clanist motivations effortlessly back into
the past, whether this is the pre-colonial past, the trusteeship period,
the era of civilian governments, or the Barre regime. This also affects
the treatment of the events and processes that accompanied or, better,
constituted state collapse. For example, the United Somali Congress’s
massacres of groups of people who, in part, had borne the brunt of
Barre’s oppression must be analyzed as a rupture — which is how its
victims experienced it — or otherwise explained. They should not be
buried in general references to anarchic violence that hold no one
responsible. Violence is mostly not arbitrary, as Besteman has pointed
out.87 Pretending that it is does not further our understanding of what
happened and why, and allows those with blood on their hands to sit
down at the table of governance once again.
In this third category, economic causes, at the heart of the new
southern historiography, receive much less attention than political
ones. Abdi Samatar’s “Empty Bowl: Agrarian Political Economy in
Transition and the Crises of Accumulation,”88 is the only study that
deals comprehensively, though briefly, with the economic causes of
the failure of the Somali state. His diagnosis includes the underaccu-
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mulation of capital (a problem that distinguishes the Fourth World
from the rest of the globe) as well as the predatory state that was kept
in power as a result of international military and economic develop-
ment aid. Samatar summarizes the developments that undermined the
farm, livestock, and plantation sectors of the economy of northern and
southern Somalia. With the end of the Cold War, he posits, assistance
petered out and the economic base of the state collapsed. However, the
withering of the Somali economy had its causes in political failure.
Samatar argues:
Unlike Botswana’s hegemonic class, the Somali petty bourgeoisie was
not united. Nor did it have disciplined leaderships who recognized the
importance of bureaucratization in conjunction with systemic accumula-
tion and the protection of the collective project.89
The disunity of the governing elite and the weakness and passivity of
the rural population created such a volatile and fragile political climate
that “long-term investment in institution-building became impossi-
ble.”90 The fact that this predatory state depended on and was boosted
by international financial and other economic aid removed it even fur-
ther from any commitment to the collective good.
Most studies do refer to the enormous amounts of refugee, eco-
nomic development, and military aid that fed Barre’s kleptocracy (and
that kept him in the saddle in spite of the growing resistance against
his rule).91 However, while Menkhaus analyzed the impact of foreign
aid on the farmers of the Jubba Valley, and Tripodi reported on how
Italian economic aid was diverted to enrich both Italian and Somali
politicians, David Rawson deals with the consequences of U.S. aid on
the Somali economy under Barre. In his “Dealing with Disintegration:
U.S. Assistance and the Somali State,”92 Rawson shows that the U.S.
used security assistance to fund large, multilateral, unwieldy, and
hugely expensive development projects. Funds allocated this way
were diverted in many ways and, even when legally used, lined the
pockets of many of the people involved, both Somalis and foreign aid
workers of various kinds. Both the policies and the lack of oversight
over how the Barre government handled the funds caused enormous
inflation and undermined the Somali economy. However, in the midst
of this disaster, the international organizations through which the U.S.
channeled much of its monies so doggedly pursued specific goals (e.g.,
to get Somalia to (re)adopt IMF structural adjustment guidelines) that
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they completely lost sight of the context: that they were enriching and
providing a luxurious lease on life to an increasingly brutal dictator.
B. The UN/U.S. Intervention
A second important theme in this third category of historiography is
the UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia. The wider literature on UN
peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the post-Cold War era has a
number of controversial themes: the inadequacy of the UN’s structure,
personnel, and decision-making processes; UN/U.S. relations during
the Somali intervention, especially the question of whether the UN
interpretation of its mandate widened (and thus conflicted with that of
the U.S.); the roles of various UN and U.S. major officials, especially
their attitudes toward the warlords and the latter’s disarmament; the
differences in “culture” and interpretations of the “rules of engage-
ment” between European and Canadian troops, on the one hand, and
U.S. troops on the other; whether the UN intervention in Somalia was
a success or a failure; and what lessons Somalia can teach us about the
future of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.93 The
analysis here focuses on those studies that have at the core of their
inquiry not only the intervention but also what it did to Somalia. These
latter contain three important contentions.
The first contention is that the UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia was
a failure. For example, Lyons and Samatar attribute this failure to the
fact that the policy guiding the intervention wavered between two
approaches: that of “accommodating existing forces” (i.e., collaborate
with the warlords, pay them rent for buildings and cash for armed
protection, and refrain from disarming them) and that of “encouraging
new institutions” (i.e., encourage other, civilian leaders and commu-
nity groups).94 Andrew S. Natsios agrees, but for different reasons. In
his “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of
Chaos,” he attributes part of the failure to the dozens of relief organi-
zations that, jealous of their autonomy, and making separate and inor-
dinately expensive deals for protection with the very warlords who
made their presence necessary, played into the hands of those who
benefited from chaos.95 Natsios explains how the food the relief agen-
cies brought in became a cause for looting, even by the merchants, who
hired thugs to get supplies for their shops. The NGOs were unpre-
pared, Natsios argues, for:
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the unrestrained looting of convoys and warehouses, kidnappings of
NGO staff for ransom, demands for higher wages by Somali staff who
used their weapons as negotiating tools against their own . . . employers,
checkpoints on every road where protection money was demanded, and
warlord demands for a share of the food stocks going into their areas.96
When the agencies began to raise private armies (the International
Committee of the Red Cross employed 15,000 to 20,000 young Somali
men at the height of the crisis), they became an integral part of the
“social pathology” they were supposed to remedy. The system they
put in place continued “to reward anti-social behavior by young men
with guns and . . . corrupt both the militias and the merchant class, the
latter of which could have been a force for order and the restoration of
some political authority.”97 No wonder the relief workers and then the
UN troops came to be seen as just another set of warlords, well fed and
wealthy, but not particularly smart or courageous.
The second contention is that humanitarian interventions in emer-
gencies that are man-made (such as the Somali crisis) are always polit-
ical and always have political implications. This is what is, for
example, argued by Clarke and Herbst, who claim that both the UN
and the U.S. were fully aware of the political dimension of the inter-
vention. They contend that:
it is simply not true that the UN greatly broadened the mission that the
United States had decided to limit. In fact, all of the major Security
Council resolutions on Somalia, including Resolution 814, the “nation
building” resolution, were written by the United States, mainly by the
Pentagon, and handed to the UN as a “fait accompli.”98
Only after the disaster of October 3, 1993, when American lives were
lost, did the U.S. get cold feet and abandon the woefully unprepared
UN. To their minds, the UN was “seduced and then abandoned by the
U.S.”99
The third contention is that the UN/U.S. intervention enormously
strengthened, provided legitimacy to, and enriched the warlords. This
is a position taken by a number of authors.100 According to Clarke and
Herbst, the intervention was responsible for “enhancing the role and
status of the warlords.”101 By not disarming them (not even partly, not
even by removing only the heavy weaponry); by taking them as major
discussion and negotiating partners; by doing business with them and
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by paying them large amounts of money to attend national reconcilia-
tion conferences (at which they would be promised even larger sums
of foreign aid), the U.S. and especially Robert Oakley made it clear for
all Somalis to see that the warlords were to be “rewarded rather than
punished.”102
Natsios, as was already intimated, comments in some detail on the
contributions that the relief organizations — and later UN troops of
many nationalities, who also participated in the protection racket —
made to the booming arms trade and thus the further militarization of
Somalia. He writes:
Most NGOs, indeed the U.S. government, never realized how massive
and organized this arms trading would become during the course of the
chaos. All the elements were there for major weapons and ammunition
trafficking: demand created by the warlords for their private armies and
by NGOs for their guard forces, supply from the Ethiopian merchants
[whose government’s huge army had just collapsed after defeat by 
the Eritrean and Tigrean forces], cash generated by the large-scale loot-
ing of food stocks and infrastructure, and protection rackets run by the
warlords. The best way to make up for the absence of a job was a
weapon. . . 103
Not only did the UN intervention not succeed, such analysis suggests,
but, by bringing a war economy as big as that of a middle-size country
to the warlords of Mogadishu, it also deepened the militarization of
the Somali civilian population and thus moved Somalia further away
from peace.104
C. Proposals for Solutions to Crisis and State Collapse
The third important theme in this universe of studies is that they pro-
pose solutions to the ongoing crisis and statelessness in Somalia. Most
of these proposals deal with the realm of politics, which will be dis-
cussed first, but a few outline economic blueprints.
1. Advocates of Clan-Based Decentralization
Of course, those who see Somali society and culture as uniquely (and
incorrigibly) kin-based propose reconciliation processes and new
political arrangements that are based on local “traditional” clan
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elders.105 They propose clan-based decentralization, either without an
overarching state, or, if they accept a state structure at all, in the con-
text of a multiplicity of states or a loose federal state.106 For these schol-
ars, only a political arrangement that is indigenous and “traditional”
can be a remedy against the artificial, centralized nation-state (parlia-
mentary or autocratic) imposed by the West, and can therefore be truly
democratic.
One such scholar is, of course, I.M. Lewis, whose position — one
must grant him that—has been consistent over a period of almost fifty
years.107 Less consistent, and therefore more politically suspect, are, for
example, those contributors to Mending Rips in the Sky who, after hav-
ing been deeply involved for more than a decade in the very dictator-
ship they now decry, suddenly promote a clan-based division of the
national spoils! Although it was during their tenure (three served as
ministers and one as a theorist of the Barre regime’s socialist program)
that this regime institutionalized the destructive clanism that exploded
into violence during the collapse of the state, they do not reflect on this
involvement, or on when and why they believe things went wrong.
Thus, they sidestep the political and intellectual accountability that
could make their proposals for a clan-based system more persuasive.108
As we saw in the historical syntheses of the first category, many
other Somali and non-Somali scholars also embraced the concept of
far-reaching decentralization along clan lines. One of the most extreme
examples of this is Maria Bongartz’s otherwise competent book enti-
tled Somalia im Bürgerkrieg: Ursachen und Perspektiven des Innen Politis-
chen Konflikts. She proposes that Somalia be reconciled and governed
by a shir (to her, an inter-clan council) of elders, selected for their per-
sonal characteristics and their ability to distance themselves from
political events.109 One must wonder how such a formula would work
for Germany, itself no stranger to centrifugal tendencies! However,
once one accepts the uniqueness of Somalis and downplays their com-
parability and similarity to other human societies of the twenty-first
century, such a solution should surprise no one. By 1999, Bongartz had
substantially refined her proposals for new political arrangements in
Somalia, as will be discussed below.110
A similar emphasis on Somali uniqueness and on “traditional”
decentralization is evident in the report written by a group of six schol-
ars and professionals (of whom four are Somalis) who, in the summer
of 1997, were sent on a fact-finding mission to Somalia by the U.S.
Institute for Peace. Removing Barricades in Somalia opens with the obser-
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vation that there are “no appropriate models elsewhere in Africa, per-
haps nowhere,” and emphasizes that it proposes political arrange-
ments “other than those of conventional unitary states.”111 The report
contains many observations and recommendations. While some are
valuable and insightful, the glaring contradictions it contains raise
questions about the feasibility of its proposals for the future. For exam-
ple, the report’s recommendations regarding “traditional institutions”
exemplify a reactionary tendency that coexists with more liberal pro-
posals.112
First of all, the picture the authors paint of the pre-colonial past is
inaccurate, for it is untrue that “the clans were more or less equal in
power,” and that “no elder believed that he could impose a military or
political hegemony on the others.”113 This is naïve and, as a basis for
modern political institutions, it constitutes quicksand. Second, the
authors, uncritically and without any contextualization, propose to
revive aspects of a traditional judicial system that, even irrespective of
questions about its compatibility with Islamic law and basic human
rights, presupposes the lack of a state:
there are also traditional mechanisms by which offenders who have
committed crimes against the clan are punished by their immediate fam-
ilies. This is achieved by clan elders meeting and then putting pressure
on the offender’s family to keep the offending member in line, even if the
crime warrants, executing him.114
This approach, the authors add in all seriousness, would avoid an
“unjust” punishment by “an external clan,” which might lead to feud-
ing.115 The advocacy of techniques of collective punishment in the con-
text of the complete privatization of justice does not bode well for the
protection of individual rights or the reconstruction of public author-
ity. The conclusion must be that the state is not a high priority for these
authors.116
Removing Barricades in Somalia is optimistic about “decentralized,
local action” as “the organizing principle around which permanent
reform can be built.”117 It even considers the possibility that the Somalis
might be “harbingers of a new, decentralized, participatory, and
democratic future for Africa . . . and the first to incorporate traditional
law and governance into modern economic structures.”118 However,
the authors themselves detail the darker realities that still exist in
Somalia: the inability of new local authorities to raise taxes (and the
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diversion of tolls and taxes by private interests),119 the presence of
numbers of private armies in the country,120 and the existence of a rag-
ing conflict “that pits warlords, faction leaders, and a rising commer-
cial elite against traditional religious and clan leaders as well as
women’s groups.”121
None of the advocates of governance by “traditional” clan or lin-
eage elders carefully define the concepts they use or the processes by
which they would establish these local authorities. For example, in the
absence of a clear elucidation of what a clan or lineage elder is or might
be, how would such a figure differ from a warlord? In both cases, the
claim to authority would seem to be based on de facto power and only
partially on position in the lineage or clan structure. Moreover, such
lineage-based claims to authority might be populist but they are not
democratic, as such leaders are not representative of the constituency
they claim to represent through an elective or other democratic
process. Such lack of clarity is dangerous, for it may allow those who
in the past gained (and abused) power via the central state now to help
themselves back into the saddle via the clan.
2. Advocates of Decentralization Based on a Blend of Old and New
Some scholars have advocated grassroots political processes and
democratic institution building that do not exclusively depend on rei-
fied notions of “traditional” lineage elders but draw on groups of
social actors and institutions whose roles and functions present a
blending of old and new. Advocates of this type of grassroots political
development leave room for, admire, and actively encourage leader-
ship roles for women, for example. While women have always been
influential in Somali society, in the pre-colonial period they did not
normally have positions of formal political leadership. The latter is,
therefore, at least potentially and, in part, a new development building
on older forms of social leadership.
In this vein, Ahmed Samatar has suggested that, before Somalis can
conduct a joint debate about the kind of state they want, five categories
of Somalis, initially along kinship lines, should come together to dis-
cuss preliminary proceedings: elders, ulema (or religious scholars),
poets, women, and modernizers (e.g., formally educated professionals
or intellectuals). Even militia leaders might be part of such initial dis-
cussions, Samatar proposes, if they are willing and able to attract a
constituency in other ways than by the gun.122 This is not so different
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from what Oakley claims to have attempted,123 or from the groups
Adam and Ford expect to be able to carry the project of reconstruc-
tion.124 Perhaps it is Bongartz, in a recent article, who articulates the
possibilities of such an approach best, when she says:
The newly emerging political institutions have to reflect identity pat-
terns as perceived by the very people who are supposed to be repre-
sented. Whether these identity patterns reflect back to traditional local
community structures, such as religious and elders’ committees, or
rather rely on “modern” constituencies, such as women and youth orga-
nizations, remains to be seen.125
This is no longer a recipe for clan-based governance,126 but rather for
local representation of all kinds, and it represents a shift of focus away
from trying to find solutions by starting at the top, at the national level,
to one that begins at the bottom and refrains from thinking about the
national level, let alone a state of whatever form, at least for the
moment.
3. Advocates of an Effective and Developmental State
The only scholar to attempt a real reimagination of the state both on
the theoretical and practical levels is Ahmed Samatar. In “The Curse of
Allah: Civil Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Soma-
lia,”127 Samatar rejects the claim “that Somalis are altogether a distinct
species” as “the height of ethnographic absurdity.”128 He boldly insists
on thinking about the Somali state in the wider context of all states as
well as theories-about-the-state throughout history. Samatar begins
with a survey of what the state is (and has been) in the thought of lib-
eral, Marxist, nationalist, and neo-Marxist theorists,129 and draws on
this analysis to conceptualize the state, concretely, as the set of institu-
tions through which government is exercised, and, theoretically, as an
expression of a philosophical and ethical vision of public order and
authority.130 Samatar sees the state relate to the private sphere of indi-
vidual, household, kin group, and so forth, on three levels: that of
agency, embodied by a particular regime in power at a particular time;
that of site, embodied in the institutions that each regime partly inher-
its and partly (re)creates; and that of mindset or ethical vision. When the
broad cultural foundations of private life, the ethical endowment of a
regime, and qualified and dedicated government functionaries share a
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common vision of what Samatar calls “political goodness,” one can
speak of a true community, or, in Islamic terms, a true umma.131
How does Samatar see the future in concrete terms? “Somalis,” he
argues, “can neither go back to the acephalous arrangements of old nor
afford to hack the central public institutions into sectarian pieces.”
While not making “an a priori argument for a unitary state,” he calls it
an “undeniable fact that hardly any society has achieved modernity
and development without a strong national state.”132 “Moral resurrec-
tion (the basis for a reconnected community),” he proposes, lies in “the
constitution of a human-rights-centered democratic yet strong polity,
and the creation of specific institutions and leadership that embody
these new departures (which should be pluralistic and based on
informed consent).”133 Arguing that “culture itself has to be continually
made, unmade, and remade,” Samatar posits that Somali culture can
be reinvigorated by adopting as philosophical principles Islamic val-
ues, kinship norms as tempered by xeer (custom), and secular political
thought.134 While these ideas are potentially in conflict, he believes that
the tension between them can be dynamic, innovative, and capable of
giving birth to new cultural foundations. How this would be institu-
tionally expressed, beyond the idea to bring together representatives
of the five categories of Somalis referred to above, is not further elabo-
rated.
Economic proposals for a new Somalia are less common in this liter-
ature than political ones. While the new school of southern history
expressed a clear moral imperative for agricultural justice and the pro-
tection of local southern farmers, the most explicit economic rendition
comes from Abdi Samatar.135 Having located two major causes of eco-
nomic collapse in the disarticulation of the Somali economy and the
underaccumulation of capital, Samatar is aware that the Somali econ-
omy must be reformed to serve the needs of the Somali people (rather
than any outside interests) and must grow through an increase in pro-
ductivity. To reach the objective of “economic growth with equity,” he
proposes a program of reform for the three major productive sectors of
the economy: the farm, livestock, and plantation sectors. The system he
outlines would allow household ownership of productive resources
and would bring profits traditionally appropriated by middlemen and
traders into the hands of producers, brought together for this purpose
in cooperatives, which should be accountable to the public. The planta-
tion sector, as well as the state’s role in production (of which the Barre
regime’s parastatals were such a disastrous example), would be abol-
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ished. All this would require efficient facilitation and organization by a
state. This state must be “a strong state,” he insists, “not a repressive or
an authoritarian one.”136 Attempting to articulate a vision that might
benefit all Africa’s failing states, Samatar writes:
A growth and social justice project presupposes an alliance of political
forces. These political forces must include small rural producers, urban
working people, and segments of the business class. . . . Creating leader-
ship with legitimacy, discipline, [and] commitment to this new social
contract, and building the necessary state apparatus and productive and
progressive public-private network[s] are key to Africa’s [and Somalia’s]
resurrection.137
Samatar asks the question of how conducive post-Cold War condi-
tions are “for developmental states to rise out of the ashes of predatory
ones.”138 Africa, he argues, has lost its autonomy twice; once when
colonial powers established governments on its soil, and again when
the “independent” states were hijacked by neo-colonial forces without
a permanent military presence on African soil. Therefore, African
states, collaborating within broad regions, must establish some auton-
omy from large “[n]eoliberal institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank [that] have usurped public policy
prerogatives and promise to turn the current crisis into a permanent
disaster.”139
However, Samatar’s plea for economic reform facilitated by an
effective, autonomous, developmental state represents a lonely voice
in this historiography. In contrast, Removing Barricades in Somalia, con-
sistent with its political proposals, advocates a “free and unregulated
market economy,”140 which allows full range “to the spirit of innova-
tion and creativity” that characterizes local initiatives, and to Somali
ingenuity in “adapting external technologies and management sys-
tems to meet needs at local levels.”141 The report is enthusiastic about
the level of dynamic, energetic, and unregulated economic activity in
Somalia.142 Airplanes are flying; houses are being built; food, fuel, and
consumer goods are available; cellular telephones and computers are
in use; the export trade has resumed; and money is being transferred.
However, here too, the darker realities, rather casually referred to in
the narrative, loom large, and give clear evidence of the dangers of
complete deregulation and privatization. Thus, the authors point out
that the safety of crops in the field and goods in transit still depend on
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their owner’s private armies and militias,143 and that “the lack of stan-
dards or acceptable terms of practice in the Somali private sector . . .
encourages ruthless and sometimes destructive behavior and unprinci-
pled practices.” Just as, in the political sphere, they saw the beginnings
of a conflict between haves and have-nots, so in the economic sphere,
they signal the emergence of a new economic elite, “possibly as indif-
ferent to the needs of the people as previous political elites.”144 This is
exactly the kind of “growth without equity” that Samatar’s proposed
state would watch out against. The rapid and unregulated deepening
of social stratification in Somalia and the increasing polarization
between those who have access to outside arms, capital, and know-
how, and those who have not, occurs in a context in which power rela-
tions are still dominated by those who wield the guns, the warlords.
Whether the latent social conflicts can be contained in the clan terms
the authors of Removing Barricades and others propose, and whether
unregulated local initiatives will undermine these warlords rather
than fatten them for a new round of fighting, is not addressed in this
report and remains to be seen.
V. Conclusion
The conclusions that can be drawn from this survey are many. First,
this historiography significantly furthers our understanding of the
causes of crisis and state collapse. The historical syntheses (of the first
category) allow us to see Somalia’s deepening political and economic
deterioration in a long-term perspective. The new school of southern
Somali history allows us to understand the role of the state (and the
state elite) as well as the deeply misguided international development
policies and funding strategies in the underdevelopment of the farm-
ing sector of the south. It was the struggle for this fertile southern land,
these studies show — and not anarchic violence alone — that, after the
collapse, led to the brutal devastation of this region and its people.
Many studies (of both the first and third category) attribute state col-
lapse, at least in part, to unchanging and incorrigible Somali kin and
clan allegiances, which they claim to be incompatible with a central
state or with any form of state at all. The most eloquent opponent of
this view is the pioneer of southern history, Lee Cassanelli. Explana-
tions that focus on how the Barre regime and the warlords who suc-
ceeded him mobilized support along clan lines are not without
meaning, Cassanelli contends. However, by ignoring the struggle for
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control of resources of all kinds that underpins such power, they con-
fuse “the form the conflict took with its substance and objectives.”145
The preoccupation with the political and with clan-balancing and
separation is a serious weakness of a good part of this body of histori-
ography. Many authors unquestioningly read clanist motivations and
violence back into the past and thus fail to problematize, periodize,
and document two important historical processes: the Barre regime’s
history of incitement to clan-on-clan violence, and the USC’s transition
from opposition to the Barre regime to clan (family) genocide. That
these two are causally related is inevitable, but how they are, and who
were the agents who carried out the violent acts, must be researched
and documented. Ahmed Samatar is correct when he counsels that:
It is important to forget and forgive, because privileged grief and venge-
fulness are cancerous to civitas; at the same time, memory keeps alive
moments of individual humiliation and collective horror for the sake of
durable alertness and vigilance.146
However, one may go further and argue that, in the absence of an
accounting for what and who initiated the cycle of clanist violence, the
Somali people may fall victim to essentialized interpretations of their
own genetic or cultural predisposition to clan hatred.
The studies analyzed here also make a contribution to understand-
ing the impact of the UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia. They forward
important arguments for seeing this involvement (from a Somali point
of view, and in spite of the fact that it initially saved many civilians
from starvation) as a failure, as it, in the end, refused to take responsi-
bility for the political dimension that is inherent in any such humani-
tarian intervention, intensified the militarization of Somali society, and
enriched, strengthened, and legitimized the warlords beyond anyone’s
imagination. Unfortunately, UN and U.S. leaders appear more inter-
ested in what Somalia can teach them with regard to a potential next
round of peacekeeping than in acknowledging and trying to reverse
the damage they did.
The historiography surveyed here is weakest in outlining possible
solutions to crisis and state collapse in Somalia. As noted, the authors
of the historical syntheses of the first category, who surpassed their
predecessors by incorporating more data and by expanding their
analyses beyond the political realm into the social and economic ones
of class, gender, and environment, remained in their proposed solu-
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tions preoccupied with clan-balancing and clan separation only. How
clan-balancing or clan separation would remedy nationwide and long-
term social problems such as the emergence of a rural and urban
underclass, widespread soil erosion, or the decline of women’s roles in
production—singled out as important causes of Somalia’s long decline
—remains unclear.
As for the southern school of history, its main objective was to docu-
ment the struggle for land in the fertile south as a cause of collapse and
warfare. However, the negative attitudes expressed toward northern
nomads, and the call to arms addressed to those Somalis of Bantu
descent who, until the 1980s, had less separatist strategies with regard
to their communal identities, are worrisome. Any move toward reduc-
ing what befell the farmers of the riverine south, especially the Gosha,
to a problem of pastoralists versus farmers, nomads versus sedentary
people, or “low-caste” versus “mainstream” alone is, as is evident
from this historiography itself, misleading and thus a disservice to the
reconstruction of Somalia.
It is the studies of the third category that, by definition, contain the
most explicit proposals for solutions. Again, the focus is overwhelm-
ingly on the political domain and on clan-based decentralization, led
by “traditional” lineage and clan elders. Some proposals advocate
local institution building that also draws on the less traditionally sanc-
tioned leadership roles of women and youth. These guidelines appear
to present real and feasible opportunities for the building of grassroots
democratic institutions. They do not, however, speak to whether
Somalis need a state and, if yes, what kind of a state.
In the historiography surveyed here, only two scholars break a
lance for a strong, i.e., effective state. Ahmed Samatar, insisting on
thinking about Somalia in the wider context of political theory and
world history, proposes an abstract but comprehensive outline of the
state as ideology, a set of actors, and a configuration of institutions (as
well as the relations among these, and between them and the private
sphere). Abdi Samatar, acutely aware of Somalia’s position in the
world economy, argues for a state that can carry the crucial project of
simultaneously creating economic growth and social equity. This is not
a minor issue, unless Somalia is to return to dependence on First
World handouts, and unless the increasing polarization between rich
and poor, within Somalia as well as in a global context, is of no con-
cern.
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These proposals for an effective state aside, the most significant fail-
ure of much of this historiography is twofold. First, its narrow focus on
the political domain and, within it, on clan relations is incongruous
with the causal analyses of structural and long-term socioeconomic
decline. Second, the absence of an awareness of the impact of the
world order on why states such as Somalia failed distorts scholarly
lenses and yields a myopic vision of how Somalia might be recon-
structed. As a result, all that remains visible are the “unique kind of
natives” (so familiar from the colonial records) who are tearing each
other apart.
Samir Amin has long held that “the polarization of the world into
center and periphery nations” is inherent in the processes of accumula-
tion that characterize capitalism.147 He argues that:
capitalist expansion has inverse effects upon the center and periphery of
the system; in the first it integrates society, on which the nation is built,
and in the second it destroys society, eventually destroying the nation
itself, or annihilating its potentialities.148
In other words, when the inequities of this world system become so
extreme that its most fragile neo-colonies begin to fail, this is a symp-
tom of capitalism’s failure to contain its polarization.
If this is even partly true, what does it imply for Somali reconstruc-
tion? Amin argues that the periphery can only surmount its marginal
status by overcoming five capitalist monopolies: those of technology,
financial markets, worldwide natural resources, media and communi-
cation, and weapons of mass destruction.149 This is only possible, he
believes, if the states of the periphery come together in regional power
blocs. Their fragmentation into ethnic homelands is taboo to this
vision.
Amin interprets ethnicity (read clanism, for the Somali context) as a
symptom of the chaos created by this inequitable global system. As
states fail, so do state elites. Ethnicity to Amin is “the recourse of cer-
tain segments of a shattered ruling class trying to reestablish some
legitimate basis for its power.”150 While kinship and clan allegiance in
Somalia have a more complex history and make-up than Amin sug-
gests,151 his analysis contains two important charges to scholars and
other thinkers about Somalia.
First, those members of the “shattered ruling class,” who are now
thronging to get back into the saddle of state, must be held accountable
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for any crimes they committed and any funds they misappropriated
during the dictatorship and the civil war. Allowing them to hide
behind the fig leaf of clan is to jeopardize any hope of reconstruction.
Second, suggesting clan-balancing as a solution to Somalia’s problems
is nothing new. This has been practiced in Somalia since colonial times
and the results are there for all to see. Scholars might heed Amin’s call
to rethink their priorities and integrate their proposed solutions into a
global perspective. Amin contends:
The world is both unified and diverse. But diversity is not exclusively, or
even principally, cultural. Emphasis on cultural diversity relegates the
major differences of position in the economic hierarchy of world capital-
ism to secondary importance. But it is at the level of the latter that we
must begin the attack on the problem.”152 
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